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THE SELF-SELECTION IN THE MIGRATION 
PROCESS: WHAT CAN WE LEARN? 
Cristina Cattaneo 
1. Introduction 
International migration has gained increasing attention in the economic literature, as the 
volume of migrants crossing the national borders has shown a stable up-ward trend. The 
literature presents a particular interest in the analysis of the determinants of migration, 
representing the factors influencing the individual decision to move: economic considerations, 
such as earning advantages, appear to be relevant features driving the choice, because 
individuals seek to enjoy favourable job opportunities moving to places where the wages are 
higher. The human capital theory in migration contributes in its statement that migration 
represents an investment which enhances the productivity of human characteristics and that two 
agents may meet in the alternative destinations different gains as well as different costs, as a 
consequence to their distinct individual features. The fact that one individual migrates, whereas 
another does not, implies that between the two occurs an important distinction: for example one 
may be more motivated than the other, may have higher abilities and higher skills, which create 
a relative wider spread between earnings and costs, and therefore ensure a higher propensity to 
migrate. “Rationality dictates that persons choosing a given alternative do so because they have 
some tangible basis for perceiving a more favourable return than those who choose otherwise” 
(Nakosteen and Zimmer, 1980; p. 840). 
The distinct returns to individual characteristics may give birth to a process of self-selection 
in migration: in fact, individuals endowed with some specific features may find more profitable 
to move than others and therefore, self-select themselves in the activity. It follows that migrants 
may not represent a random sample of the home country population, but they are selected in a 
systematic way from the relevant distributions. Self-selection could arise with respect with 
different individual characteristics: some are observable elements, such as wealth and education, 
while some others are unobservable features, such as ambition and ability. 
The implications of this phenomenon are quite serious whenever the selection involves the 
most skilled and the most motivated individuals: in fact, according to Bhagwati and Hamada Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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(1974), the outflow of skilled workers is regarded as more critical compared to the emigration of 
less skilled individuals, because there are social costs related to the departure of individuals who 
are employed in socially important occupations as well as fiscal losses associated with the 
public subsidies to education. The brain drain, in fact, induces a detrimental cost to the labour 
sending countries, whenever the social marginal product of labour exceeds the marginal 
product, and this seems the case with doctors for example; moreover, if education is financed by 
the State, which will recover in the future the returns on this investment through a progressive 
taxation, the emigration of highly educated individuals will deprive those remaining in the home 
country of this returns, worsening consequently their welfare. Finally, the departure of skilled 
individuals produces negative externalities, as predicted by the endogenous growth framework, 
which highlights the importance of human capital as a source of growth. 
Despite the sensitivity of this topic, however, there is not a clear picture upon the relevance 
of the process of selectivity and in particular upon the direction of the selection. The empirical 
investigation is hindered by a lack of comprehensive international data: in fact, not only the 
figures on international migration are limited, but also they do not offer detailed information on 
the observable characteristics of migrants. Moreover, the process of self-selection can occur 
along unobservable characteristics, which, by their nature, cannot be captured. 
The objective of this survey is to review the theoretical and the empirical literature in order 
to cast some light on the direction of the migration selection and to identify the factors which 
induce a skilled rather than an un-skilled migration: therefore, some conclusion upon the 
existence as well as the determinants of a selective process in migration will be offered. 
2. Self-Selection in the Migration Process 
2.1 Models with Asymmetric Information 
The first attempt to model the direction of the selection bias within a context of international 
migration is offered by Kwok and Leland (1982): according to this model, the assumption of 
imperfect labour market is crucial in the prediction of the outcome. In fact, the authors introduce 
information asymmetry in the origin labour market and perfect information in the destination 
country, which represents the place of training of the immigrant labour force. The uneven set of 
information between the two countries can alone generate what the authors define a “brain drain 
problem”, implying that the high skilled workers leave the country of origin: this result follows 
despite the wage gap between home and destination is limited, the migrants’ location 
preferences are biased in favour of home country and the worker’s productivity is the same in 
both countries. Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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The framework is very simple: individuals seek to maximize their utilities and move to 
places where wages are higher. Given that the model aims to explain the high number of 
students from less developed countries who study in the Western world and do not return in the 
home countries, the authors place the information asymmetry in the home nation
1: in fact, the 
country of emigration is the place where migrants obtained their education and therefore, 
foreign employers have a more accurate understanding of the true productivity, due to the 
familiarity with the academic system and the historical experience in facing domestic as well as 
foreign workers. Therefore, the workers’ productivity is assumed perfectly observable abroad, 
whereas it is unknown by the employers in the home country, prior to hiring; moreover, under 
perfect labour markets, the wage that would prevail reflects the workers’ productivity, whereas 
under asymmetric information the wage reflects the average productivity.  
Introducing home preferences, which is formalized by the assumption that migrants compare 
the wage in the home country with k times the foreign salary, with k<1, the migration condition 
of a worker of productivity p is: 
) p ( kw w F H <  
where  H w  is the wage offered in the home country and  ) p ( wF  is the wage paid abroad. An 
individual with productivity p compares earnings at home with the discounted wage abroad and 
migrates only if the former is strictly smaller than the latter. If there is no asymmetric 
information and the wage differentials between home and destination are not too large, the 
existence of home preference can be consistent with zero migration. However, the introduction 
of asymmetric information allows an equilibrium with emigration such that the “productivity of 
any worker remaining abroad exceeds the productivity of any worker returning home” (Kwok 
and Leland, 1982, p. 94): in other words, the model predicts a positive self-selection. To proof 
the statement, the authors introduce two arbitrary individuals with productivity  h p and f p , such 
that the first remains at home whereas the other migrates: provided that the foreign market pays 
according to the marginal productivity, for the first individual it must hold:  ) p ( kw w h F H > , 
while for the second  ) p ( kw w f F H < . It follows that  ) p ( w ) p ( w f F h F <  and therefore 
f h p p < . 
An extension of the previous model is provided by Katz and Stark (1984) who introduced 
different hypotheses in terms of both the “location” of the information imperfection as well as 
the magnitude of the wage differentials between home and destination. In fact first they allow 
the information asymmetry to be placed not only in the home but also in the destination nations 
alternatively, and second they investigate the effects of both a small and a large wage gap Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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between the two places. In this way they show that the treatment of migration proposed by 
Kwok and Leland is only one of the four plausible scenarios; moreover they find that the use of 
alternative hypotheses imply opposite outcomes in terms of the direction of the selection. 
In agreement with Kwok and Leland, when imperfect information upon the true productivity 
of the workers exists, the employers pay according to the workers’ average productivity and the 
marginal productivity otherwise. The conclusions of their work can be summarized as follows: 
first, under perfect information both in the destination and in the host labour market, either no 
migration or complete labour drain can potentially occur, depending on the assumption 
regarding the magnitude of the wage differentials in the two states: it should be clear that if 
destination offers substantial higher wages, even after introducing a discount factor to account 
for home preference, all individuals favour working abroad. The reverse case of no migration 
occurs if the gap in earnings is not big enough.  
Second, the choice of the location of the asymmetry, whether in the origin or in the host 
country, is crucial in determining who migrates. Katz and Stark do not agree with the suggestion 
that foreign employers rather than national have perfect foresight upon the true productivity of 
labour, and allow the more likely assumption that imperfect information is located in the foreign 
labour market, whereas home country enjoys perfect information. The outcome, which has been 
formalized in a more rigorous way in a subsequent contribution (Katz and Stark, 1987) states 
that if this scenario occurs and if the difference in earnings in the two countries is large enough, 
the bottom skill workers migrate, which contradicts the prediction of positive selection of Kwok 
and Leland
2. On the contrary, if the earning differential between home and destination is small, 
no migration will occur.  
To proof the statement, two individuals with different productivities are introduced and their 
migration behaviours are compared. If  p  is the top skill level migrating and 
* p is a level of 
productivity such that  p p <
* , it follows that  ) p ( w ) p ( w H
*
H < . The top skill individual 
enjoys a higher wage than the lower skill individual in the home country. The hypothesis that 
p  migrates implies that  F H kw ) p ( w < , where  F w  is wage payable in the destination country 
to a migrant of unknown productivity, which reflects the average product of all members of the 
group. It follows that  F H
*
H kw ) p ( w ) p ( w < <  and therefore individual 
* p  will also find 
profitable migrating. Therefore, only the less skilled workers, with productivity less than or 
equal to p , migrates. Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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2.2 The Human Capital model 
Sjaasstad (1962) introduced the human capital approach in a migration framework. He 
modelled the migration decision as an investment which aims to increase the productivity of 
human resources. The innovative feature of the approach is related to the central role gained by 
personal characteristics in the evaluation of future earnings and costs following the decision to 
migrate.  Depending on the skill levels, for example, agents face different remunerations in the 
alternative locations and different costs of migration and therefore compare the expected returns 
in all possible destinations, including the home location. Variables like experience, age, sex, 
education, occupation or training affect earnings and indeed give the estimates of the returns to 
migration.  The human capital variables have a crucial role in the migration process because 
they affect the likelihood of both internal and international movement, through their impact on 
earnings and costs. The human capital model, therefore, offers insights upon the determinants of 
the selectivity: given that the expected income, net of migration costs, influences migration, the 
type of selectivity depends on how the skill levels are rewarded in the alternative locations and 
on how they affect the costs of migration.  
2.2.1 Constant time-equivalent costs of migration 
Following the innovative contributions of the human capital model, Borjas (1987) presents 
an analysis of the selectivity of migration. Borjas entered the economic debate on the selectivity 
of international migration criticizing the empirical findings of the “first generation” studies of 
this literature (Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980). These analyses support the idea that migrant are 
more able and more motivated than non-migrants, as it follows from the empirical finding that 
immigrants manifest a steeper age-earnings profile than native population, and that, after a 
reasonable short time, the age-earnings of migrants overtake those of natives. Borjas, however, 
reports that these conclusions are an artefact of the application of a single cross section of data: 
in fact, pooling information of different generations of immigrants, the aging effect cannot be 
disentangled from the cohort effects of different waves of immigrants. The declining of labour 
market quality between successive immigrants cohort may have contributed to the apparent fast 
increase in the migrants wage, estimated from a single cross section of data. On the contrary, the 
author theoretically predicts the negative selection of the immigrants on the basis of a model of 
comparative advantage. 
The author adapted the seminal model of Roy (1951), originally developed in a context of 
occupational decision, to a migration choice. The original version of the Roy model offers an 
example of self-selection based on comparative advantage; in fact, different occupations provide 
distinct returns depending on the abilities of the workers.  While modelling the occupation Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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choice as an utility maximization, Roy emphasizes that the distribution of income in the 
alternative sectors determine the allocation of skills in the occupations. The application of Roy’s 
general framework can be found in a variety of other labour market settings
3: among others 
Borjas (1987) models international migration.  
Migration incentives in the model depend on earning opportunities across countries net of 
migration costs. Borjas decomposes the individual potential earnings at home (H) and abroad 
(F) into a part due to observed characteristics (µ ) and a second part due to unobservable 
elements (ε ), which should be interpreted as the abilities of individuals. The earning function, 
therefore, can be expressed as: 
i i i w ln ε µ + =      i=Home, Foreign      [1] 
where  i ε ∼N(0,
2
i σ ) 
The author introduces only one type of cost, which is assumed constant across all individuals 
in the home country, because it reflects a constant fraction of home foregone incomes. The 
author defines this cost “the time-equivalent measure of cost”, as it captures the time spent in 
the process of emigration. The assumption implies the absence of any efficiency effect of ability 
in migration: in this model, in fact, there is no role for skills and education in reducing costs. 
The decision to migrate is expressed by the Index function I: 
) ( ) C ( )
C w
w
ln( I H F f H F
H
F ε ε µ µ − + − − ≈
+
=      [2] 
where  f C  represents foregone earnings. Emigration occurs if I is greater than zero.  
The conditions which determine the type of selection prevailing, positive or negative, are 
determined from the above equation: it can be shown that, whenever the distribution of income 
for skill levels is more dispersed in the destination than in the origin country, individuals will be 
positively selected. Under this circumstance, “source country taxes high-ability workers and 
insures less able workers against poor labour market outcomes” (Borjas, 1994 p. 1689).  On the 
contrary, if the country of origin displays a higher differential in skill rewards compared to 
destination, migrants will be drawn from the lower tail of the income distribution.  
The author in fact demonstrates, with a little of computation, that the direction of the self-





, where  i σ  is the standard deviation of the error term in equation 
[1]: in particular if the ratio is less than one, the income gap between the average emigrant and 
the average person in the home country, as well as the earning gap between the average 
immigrant and the average native of the destination country will be negative, implying negative 
selection
4. Therefore, Borjas is able to show that the type of self-selection depends on the Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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second moment of the earning distributions and neither the differences in mean income between 
home and destination nor the magnitude of the costs influences the outcome of the model.  
Borjas’ final conclusion that migrants are negatively selected, which is contradicting the 
“first generation” findings, follows from the observation that a large number of labour exporting 
countries have higher inequality than the major destination nations
5. In fact, high returns to 
schooling and high dispersion in earnings in source nations, allow the high skill individuals to 
be relatively better rewarded in source countries, whereas these conditions provide low skill 
individuals with stronger incentives to migrate.  
2.2.2 The efficiency effect of ability in migration  
The model and the predictions offered by Borjas opened the ground for subsequent and 
alternative formulations which aimed to draw some lights upon the selectivity of migration. 
Chiswick (2000) for example, disputed the hypotheses of the model proposed by Borjas and 
presents a different framework which predicts opposite conclusions: namely, the tendency 
toward positive self-selection of migrants.  
The two models diverge upon the treatment of migration costs: first, while Borjas considers 
only one type of cost, which is a constant proportion of foregone earnings, Chiswick introduces 
also direct, out-of-pocket costs, which do not depend on home income, such as transportation 
costs or general expenses to process the migration requirements. Second, Chiswick allows 
ability to reduce the costs of migration: in fact, he assumes that high skill individuals are more 
efficient in using resources as they require less units of time to compute the same investment; 
alternatively he assumes that the skills improve the efficiency in utilizing out-of-pocket 
expenditures. On the contrary, in the model of Borjas there is no role for ability to improve the 
efficiency in migration. The introduction of these hypotheses turns the conclusion of Borjas into 
the opposite direction. 
In agreement with the human capital framework, a rational agent chooses to migrate “if the 
rate of return to the investment in migration is greater than or equal to the interest costs of funds 
for the investment in human capital” (Chiswick, 2000, p.3). The rate of return can be expressed 








=           [ 3 ]  
where  F w  and  H w denotes the earnings in the destination and in the origin respectively. The 
costs can be decomposed into foregone earnings,  f C  and direct out-of-pocket costs,  d C . The 
model assumes that the wage differential for low (U) and high (S) ability workers is constant 
between home and destination.  Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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iU iS w k w ) 1 ( + =      i=Home, Foreign;   k > 0       [ 4 ]  
The comparison between the rate of return to the investment for the high ability persons ( S r ) 
and for the low ability persons ( U r ) determines the direction of the migration selection.  
In contrast with Borjas, the model predicts a positive self-selection, and this is obtained 
introducing direct out of pocket costs. In fact, assuming the existence of fixed costs, which do 
not vary with ability ( dU dS C C = ) and allowing the foregone earnings of high ability workers to 
be a positive portion of foregone earnings of low ability workers ( fU fS C ) k ( C + = 1 ), it 
follows that  U S r r >
6. Moreover, the higher the earning gap between low and high ability 
workers (1+ k), the greater the differentials between  S r  and  U r . High direct costs reduce the 
overall incentive to migrate but they increase the propensity for favourable selectivity of 
migration: in fact high ability workers can compensate for the high fixed costs with greater 
earnings compared to low skill workers and therefore, the move will be more profitable for the 
most skilled persons. On the contrary, on the basis of this model, if there were no fixed costs 
induced by emigration, there would not be any type of selection. 
Second, the model predicts even higher tendency for positive selection, if it is allowed that 
ability reduces the emigration expenses. In fact, ability can enhance efficiency in investment in 
migration, reducing either the units of time lost for managing the process and therefore the 
foregone earnings, or the out-of-pocket costs; this makes the investment more profitable for 
high skill individuals. This situation can be expressed, for example, as the more able facing 
lower fixed costs of migration such that  dU dS C ) ( C λ + = 1  and  0 < λ . 
















; the greater the 
efficiency ( ) 0 > λ , the larger is  S r  relative to  U r . 
The treatment of migration costs distinguishes the model proposed by Chiswick from the 
contribution of Borjas: the difference, however, appears to be crucial in the prediction of the 
direction of the selection. In fact, allowing ability to impact on costs and introducing the 
possibility of positive fixed out of pocket costs, migration returns for high ability workers will 
be greater than the returns for low ability workers, inducing a positive selection. On the 
contrary, if there are not out of pocket costs, if ability does not play any role in reducing the 
costs of migration, and if “the ratio of wages across regions is  greater for the low ability, they 
would have a greater propensity to migrate” (Chiswick, 2000, p. 6). In fact, in agreement with 
Borjas, assuming that  0 = d C , that the relative wage differentials varies across nations and that Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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the only migration costs are a constant proportion of forgone earnings 
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> .  This condition implies that the 
dispersion of wages for different skills is greater in the origin than in the destination country. 
2.2.3 Additional Contributions 
The strand of theoretical literature, which follows, mainly supports the positive selection 
view. Additional hypotheses are introduced to the framework offered by Roy and applied by 
Borjas, which corroborate the prediction that migrants may be chosen from the upper tail of the 
home country’s income distribution. 
Brucker and Trubswetter (2004) provides an extended version of Roy’s model, which, in line 
with the assumption of Chiswick, introduces a negative correlation between abilities and 
moving costs; in fact, it is reasonable to believe that the human capital characteristics that 
enhance the returns in the labour market do also ensure lower moving expenditure. Therefore, 
both the benefits and the costs of migration are not equally distributed across the population. 
The cost function is assumed to be normally distributed with mean τ and disturbance η . 
η τ + = C            [ 5 ]  
where η ∼N(0, 
2
η σ ) 
Applying the different hypothesis upon individual costs, the migration index becomes: 
) ( ) ( ' η ε ε τ µ µ − − + − − ≈ h f h f I         [ 6 ]  
The conditions predicting the direction of the selection should now encounter the existence 
of a new term η  , which represents the unobservable affecting the migration costs. The author 
demonstrates that the direction of the self-selection is influenced by the correlation coefficient 
between labour market abilities and moving costs: in particular, the assumption that abilities 
decrease the migration costs ensures a higher probability of positive selection. Stated in another 
way, the fact that moving costs are influenced by individual ability strengthens the chance that 
emigrants are positively selected. Finally the author highlights the implication on the selectivity 
bias of some changes in economic factors: for example, Brucker concludes that higher income 
inequality in the origin compared to the destination region does not necessary introduce a 
negative self-selection, as the effect of an increase in inequality on the selectivity is ambiguous. 
An alternative extension of the Roy’s model focuses on migrant selection in terms of 
observable characteristic, such as education, rather than ability. For this purpose, Chiquiar and Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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Hanson (2005) introduce the effect of schooling on earnings, modifying the wage equation in 
[1] as: 
s ) w ln( i i i δ µ + =      i=Home, Foreign      [7] 
where s is the observable level of schooling andδ is the return to schooling for migrants in 
the two countries. He also assumes that  F H δ δ > , to account for possible scarce supply of skills 
in the labour exporting country and that  F H µ µ <  to emphasize that the mean wage is lower in 
the home country than in destination. Moreover, the assumption of constant migration costs is 
rejected, as better educated individuals likely face lower expenditure, as they are better able to 
manage the migration process or they incur in less stringent credit constraints
7. Therefore, the 
time-equivalent migration cost, which represents the foregone earnings in the model of Borjas, 
is a negative function of the level of schooling: 
s ) C ln( c c f δ µ − =           [ 8 ]  
and the migration index function becomes: 
s
H F H F f H F
c c e s ) ( C ) w ln( ) w ln( ' ' I
δ µ δ δ µ µ
− − − + − = − − ≈     [9] 
It can be shown that the direction of the selection now jointly depends on the size of the 
migration costs and on the distribution of schooling in the labour sending country. 
If the migration costs are small, a negative selection occurs: in fact, the existence of 
migration costs which decrease with the level of education does not provide a sufficient 
constraint to low-skill individuals and at the same time, high return to schooling in the home 
country prevents high skill workers from moving. On the contrary, if migration costs are large 
and if the schooling distribution is not too skewed in either of the tails, migrants, compared to 
non-migrants, will be individuals with intermediate schooling. In fact, the effect of high return 
to schooling in the home country on the one hand and the effect of high costs of migration for 
low level of schooling on the other, create a disincentive to move for both higher and lower 
educated individuals. However, if the schooling distribution in the home country is highly 
skilled to the right, with the average education level higher than a minimum threshold  L s , 
migrants will have lower mean education. Whereas, if the mass of the population is 
characterized by a low level of education and the average value of schooling is below a certain 
threshold  U s , with  U L s s < , migrants will positive selected.  The author states that the 
implications of the model do not differ if the analysis accounts for possible selectivity in terms 
of unobservable characteristics, such as ability.  
To summarize, some lessons can be drawn throughout the theoretical models: first, sending 
country characteristics vis-à-vis host country conditions –earning gaps, different level of Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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inequality, asymmetric information- create uneven incentives for different levels of abilities or 
education, and therefore create the ground for a selectivity process. Second, costs do represent 
the key determinants of the direction of the selectivity, which is highly sensitive to both the size 
of the migration expenditure and to the hypotheses regarding the links between costs and ability. 
In particular, it can be stated that high fixed costs induce a positive self-selection, which is 
reinforced by the possibility that high skilled workers are more efficient than low skilled 
workers in reducing costs. On the contrary, high dispersion of earnings in the home country, 
provided the absence of fixed out of pocket costs, and imperfect information in the foreign 
labour market predict a negative self-selection among emigrants.   
3. The empirics on Self-Selection 
The process of self selection, as already mentioned, can occur along a number of different 
individual dimensions: among others, for example, migrants can be selected in terms of their 
ability or in terms of their educational level. It should be clear that while the education of 
individuals can be captured, through the number of years of schoolings or the qualification 
levels, the ability, motivation and ambition of individuals represent unobservable features, 
which cannot be measured. This point becomes critical whenever the self- selection in terms of 
un-observable characteristics has to be empirically analysed. It is usually assumed that skills 
and education coexist in the same individual and therefore skills are proxied by qualification. 
However, in the remaining part of the paper, a clear distinction will be made between the 
selectivity in terms of observable and un-observable elements. 
3.1 The characteristics of migrants over time 
The simplest way to analyse the selection of migrants in terms of observables characteristics, 
is to survey the level of education of movers. Carrington and Detragiache (1998) for example, 
compute selection rates from 61 developing countries to OECD countries in 1990 by 
educational attainment and they report that the majority of migrants own secondary and tertiary 
education, whereas the participation of individuals with primary education is quite limited. A 
similar analysis is conducted by Docquier and Marfouk (2005) for 190 countries, both 
developing and industrial, in 1990 and 2000, to OECD nations: differently, the assessment of 
the selection rate highlights the existence of a relevant share of primary educated movers, in 
both years: for example in 2000, 36 per cent of the total stock of migrants has only primary 
education, compared to 35 per cent with tertiary education. On the contrary, the selection rates, 
which compare the number of emigrants in different educational categories with the number of Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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remaining residents in the source country for the same educational group, emphasise the 
existence of a brain drain problem for labour exporting countries; in fact, these nations seem to 
lose a big fraction of their highly educated individuals: in 2000, for example, the average 
emigration rate among individuals with tertiary education is 5.4 per cent, whereas it is 1.8 per 
cent and 1.1 per cent for secondary and primary education respectively. 
An equivalent method of investigation compares migrants’ average qualification levels with 
the average educational performance of non-migrants in the source country. Hatton and 
Williamson (2004), for example, report the average years of education of movers and of stayers 
of the same home country: the figures show that migrants have a sensible higher qualification 
attainment than the average person remaining at home. The interesting result, however, is that 
the educational gap between the two groups varies significantly across countries and it is 
influenced by factors such as the geographical proximity of the home country with the 
destination nation. In fact the reported data shows that the gap between movers and stayers is 
much smaller for Mexicans, who migrate to US, and for east Europeans, Balkans and Turks, 
who move mainly to EU than for other nationalities, who do not have important destinations at 
close proximity. They show that Mexican movers have only 1.2 year of schooling more than co-
nationals, and migrants from East Europe, Balkan states and Turkey have 4.8 more years, 
whereas among Africans the gap in years of schooling between the two groups is 10.8 and 
among Asians is 8.6. 
Low migration costs, due to the proximity with host countries, might be responsible for the 
weaker positive selection of the first group of countries: in agreement with the theoretical 
predictions (Chiswick, 2000; Chiquiar and Hanson, 2005), low costs of migration induce a less 
favourable positive selectivity, whereas high expenditures determine a more positive selection. 
The African case, for example, can confirm that long distance to destinations, together with 
lower source country inequality and a stronger effect of poverty constraint induces a sharp 
positive self-selection.  
An empirical analysis conducted by Mora and Taylor (2005) confirms the findings that 
Mexican migrants are not endowed with particularly high education: positive selection, in fact 
occurs only if schooling plays an important role in alleviating the costs and the risks of 
migration or if it has a greater positive impact on income at the migrant destination than at 
origin. In the case of Mexican migration, however, migration costs are low and therefore the 
scope for ability to reduce the costs and risk is limited. Moreover, the low demand for skilled 
Mexican labour in US, which depresses the return to skills of Mexican migrants, implies that 
schooling becomes more valued in Mexico than in US. Therefore, the finding of Mora and 
Taylor corroborates the Borjas’ prediction of negative selection: the combination of a higher Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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skill premium in origin countries compared to destination, together with low fixed out of pocket 
costs, determines the direction of the selection. 
The educational information can be analysed in a third direction, assessing the educational 
attribute of the secular flows of migration. Hatton and Williamson (2004) document the existing 
trend in migration after the 19
th century and underline two distinct shifts from very positive 
toward negative selection which took place both after 1820 and after 1950. The authors, in fact, 
present how the labour market quality of migrants has decreased across time and how this shift 
impacted on the earning gap between old and new immigrants.  
It should be noted that, according to Borjas (1992) the quality change of migrants can be 
attributed to two factors: a shift due to changes in the source country composition and a shift 
due to the specific changes in the educational level of migrants from the single country of 
origin. In the case of US immigration, for example, “the changing national origin mix explains 
over 90 percent of the decline in educational attainment and relative wages across successive 
waves between 1960 and 1980” (Borjas, 1994, p. 1685); in fact, throughout the time, the 
country composition included more low-wage, low-skilled and low-schooled regions and this 
variation from richer to poorer labour exporting countries is responsible for lowering the 
educational level of migrants.  
The reported trend toward negative selection along the time, however, is not in contrast with 
the country level support to positive selection (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998; Docquier and 
Marfouk, 2005). In fact, the two events can play simultaneously: while on the one hand, the 
country mix composition is shifting toward the less developed source regions, inducing a 
negative country level selection, on the other hand, within the single source country, the most 
educated individuals find more profitable to migrate, generating a positive self-selection at 
individual level.  
The theoretical predictions, therefore, are partially in agreement with the empirical evidence: 
in fact, those models, which introduced the effects of earnings and costs in a bilateral flow 
analysis, namely between one origin and one destination country, concluded in favour of 
positive self-selection within the same country of origin, and this finding is supported by the 
empirics. What the theoretical models did not capture, however, is the tendency toward a 
negative selection, as a consequence of a country mix change.  
Moreover, it should be emphasized that immigration policies in destination countries play a 
critical role in influencing the direction of the selection: for example, while prior to 1965 
immigration in US was restricted according to a national-origins quota system, the 1965 
Amendment to the Immigration and National Act, made the allocation of entry visas less 
dependent upon immigrant skill and more on family reunification and this policy shift has likely Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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induced a less-skilled migration flow. Therefore, while the theoretical models emphasize the 
importance in the selection process of sending countries vis-à-vis host nation characteristics, the 
role of destination country specifics, such as migration policy, has been completely neglected in 
the formalizations, which, as a consequence, failed to predict the selectivity component due to 
the country mix.  
There is a second factor, however, which has never been considered in the theoretical 
models, but which is likely to play an important role in the process of self-selection: the 
constraint introduced by poverty; in fact, poverty hampers low skill migration and therefore 
emphasizes a positive selectivity. This factor influences both the country mix selectivity and the 
selectivity within the single source nation: Hatton and Williamson (2004) for example, state that 
as the poverty constraint on immigration was released, because of transport revolution which 
lowered the travel costs, and because of industrial revolution, which increased the working class 
earnings, the positive selection decreased and the negative selection increased. On the contrary, 
analysing the skill premium for different types of British workers in 19
th century, the authors 
emphasise that workers from low skilled occupations had the greatest incentives to migrate, but 
the poverty constraint limited their chance of emigration.  
3.2 The assimilation of migrants in the host labour market 
So far, the observable quality of migrants have been analysed with reference to the home 
country population. However, the direction of the selection can also be judged relative to the 
destination country population, providing information upon the assimilation of migrants. The 
empirical evidence suggests that movers compared to native born have lower than mean quality, 
and this disadvantage seems to worsen along the time. Borjas (1995) for example, reports that in 
1970 the average years of schooling of newly arrived migrants was slightly lower than the mean 
educational attainment of US natives, whereas the gap diverged in more recent years: in fact, in 
1990 the gap was three time as much as the figure in 1970, increasing from 0.4 year of 
disadvantage to 1.3 year. Although the level of education increased among migrants between 
the two periods, it did not grow at the same rate as it did for American citizens. It should be 
noted that the fact of being positively selected in the origin country does not ensure migrants to 
have higher educational level than the average individual in the host country. 
The performance of migrants in the host labour market has been subject of a large number of 
empirical studies, which investigate whether foreign born assimilate with the native population. 
Successful performance of movers has been interpreted as a proof of a self-selection process. 
According to this strand of empirical literature, the assimilation capacity of migrants can be 
tested comparing the migrants’ earnings after move with the average earning of the native Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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population.  The initial wage gap between movers and natives does not imply any conclusion 
upon the direction of the selectivity: in fact, individuals newly arrived, lack knowledge of 
destination countries customs and language, lack information about job opportunities or lack 
firm-specific training and experience: therefore, they are likely to be disadvantaged compared to 
the host country workers. The crucial feature however, is weather earning crossovers between 
the two groups exist: if migrants have the same level of labour market ability and work 
motivation than native born, the earnings of the foreign born would potentially equal, but would 
not go above that of the native born, ceteris paribus. On the contrary if, other observable 
characteristics being equal, migrants show more innate ability than the native population, the 
wage of foreigners may overtake that of natives after a certain period. 
Chiswick (1978) first estimates earning functions, which analyse the distinction between 
migrants’ and natives’ performance. The author studies the assimilation process of movers into 
the US market due to un-observable characteristics, and this analysis represents an indirect way 
to assess the relevance and the direction of the self-selection. It should be clear that the human 
capital of foreigners largely enhances their performance in the host country, thought it is not the 
exclusive determinant: in fact, ability, motivation, ambition and other non-measurable features 
have a critical role in boosting the degree of assimilation.  
The empirical analysis adopts a human capital wage function, which controls for 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as years of schooling, region of residence or marital status; 
for labour market experience; for migration status and for years since migration. A cross section 
of individuals, which includes US immigrants and US native born, is estimated and the key 
finding is that at the time of arrival, immigrants earn less than the native born, whereas they 
show a faster wage growth than their counterpart: it results that the earning functions cross after 
approximately 13 years since migration. The suggested explanation for this outcome is that 
migrants possess greater ability and stronger motivation than natives, which more than 
compensate for the initial lack of knowledge and skills relevant for the US labour market: in 
order words, the result gives support to the hypothesis of positive self-selection. 
This conclusion, however, has been challenged some years later by Borjas (1985), who 
criticized the methodology adopted. In fact, he states that the effect of possible quality changes 
within successive migrant cohorts has been erroneously interpreted as the effect of assimilation 
in a cross-section regression analysis. Borjas highlights that in the cross section framework, 
proposed by Chiswick and by other authors, there is an implicit assumption of fixed cohort 
quality: in order words, it is assumed that labour market characteristics of migrants arrived in 
the past can forecast the future earnings of recent migrants, and therefore, the possibility that 
recent movers might be inherently different from old immigrants is not taken into consideration. Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
 
16 
However, if the quality of migrants’ waves has experienced some secular trend, inducing some 
intrinsic differences in productivity across cohorts, the estimated coefficient of the 
“assimilation” variable
8 in a cross section would be biased, invalidating any conclusion upon the 
degree of assimilation of migrants. The direction of the distortion, moreover, depends on 
weather quality has decreased or increased over time.  
As mentioned above, the hypothesis of a shift in migrants’ quality has been documented in 
the empirical literature: in particular, it is widely recognized that the change in national origin 
mix has decreased the skill levels of US immigrants, providing support to the Borjas’ critique. 
Therefore, the empirical analysis of Chiswick produced an overestimation of the true 
relationship between wage and years since migration as well as of the wage growth of a 
particular cohort. Borjas (1987), to account for these quality differentials within migrant 
cohorts, introduced in the regression a term capturing the calendar year of arrival in US: in this 
way, the dynamic of the particular cohort can be tracked across several cross sections of data. 
Three measures of quality are thus estimated: the first is the wage of the most recent cohort of 
immigrants relative to the wage of natives, which provides an idea of the earning disadvantage 
that the newly arrived migrants face before any assimilation process occurs; the second is the 
wage growth across 10 years of a specific cohort relative to native, which captures the degree of 
assimilation of migrants; the third is the wage differentials between the alternative cohorts, 
which indicates the extent of cohort quality change. 
The key finding is that the assimilation rates of migrants differ substantially by country of 
origin: in fact, movers from some countries show a high degree of assimilation while 
immigrants from other country do not assimilate at all. To this feature corresponds alternative 
trends of cohort qualities by country of origin: in fact, in some cases the quality of successive 
cohorts increases, suggesting positive selection, while in other it decreases, and this may 
indicate that the quality of immigrants is influenced by source country specific characteristics: 
in particular, if the predictions of the Roy model were correct, it would be expected that at a 
higher (lower) level of source country inequality corresponds a negative (positive) self-selection 
of migrants. 
To test this hypothesis the author analyses the relationship between entry wage differentials 
between migrants and natives from the origin countries, which represent a measure of 
immigrant quality, and the income inequality of the labour exporting nations, controlling for 
other country level characteristics. The country level income distribution is proxied by the ratio 
of the income of the top 10 percent of the households and the bottom 20 percent. The outcome 
of the analysis, however, is unable to supply an explicit conclusion: in fact, the income 
inequality exerts only a frail negative impact on migrants’ quality and the coefficient is not Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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robust to alternative specifications: in three out of four specifications, in fact, the coefficient of 
the inequality variable is not statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, Borjas interprets the 
result as a support of the theory: he quotes that “immigrants from countries with more income 
inequality are of lower quality. This result is consistent with the theoretical implications of the 
Roy model.” (Borjas, 1987; p. 546) 
It should be noted that the author is aware of two possible shortcomings in the analysis; first, 
there is a specification problem: in fact, the true country specific feature which influences the 
self-selection in the Roy model is the relative dispersion of opportunities in the source market, 
which does not completely correspond to inequality. Therefore, the attempt to approximate this 
element with the income inequality can weaken the link between the theory and the empirical 
work (Borjas, 1987). Second, there is a selection problem: in fact, the analysis does not take into 
consideration the incidence of return migration, which, as far as it potentially develops as a non 
random process in the immigrant population, it can itself be a source of selection bias in the 
estimated relationship (Borjas, 1985).  
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) and Chiswick (2000) raise another set of objections to the 
framework. The first authors emphasize that the origin country sample, which includes 41 
nations only, can constitute a highly selective sample and therefore it may itself bring in the 
analysis an additional process of self-selection. Second, according to Chiswick, the test 
implemented by Borjas, does not truly assess the effect of income inequality on positive or 
negative selectivity, but it only verifies “whether inequality in income in the origin is associated 
with a greater or lesser degree of selectivity” (Chiswick, 2000, p.11); In fact, a negative 
relationship between country of origin inequality and entry wage gap does not preclude 
migrants to be positive selected: it may only suggest that higher income inequality in the source 
nation reduces the incentives to migrate for high quality individuals. Both a positive and a 
negative selection can be compatible with the estimated result.  
3.3 Taking selectivity seriously 
The previous debate seems to suggest that a clear tendency toward one single type of 
selectivity does not exist, but idiosyncratic features at a country level may play a determinant 
role in the selectivity process. However, it should be noted that the existence of selectivity 
imposes econometric problems when OLS are utilized: in fact, if the sample used for estimation 
is not random, conventional linear regression techniques return biased estimates of the 
population parameters. The consequences implied by the process of sample selection, however 
were not taken into consideration in the previous analysis. Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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3.3.1 Parametric Techniques 
The first time the term selectivity bias entered the economic literature was in 1974 when 
Heckman analysed the wage determination process within a context of female labour 
participation; in 1979 the author presented an analytical clarification of the concept of selection 
bias, resulting whenever non-random selected samples are used. The typical situation which 
gives rise to a selectivity bias is when the outcome variable is not observed for the entire 
sample, but only for part of it; this problem has been traditionally interpreted by the literature as 
a truncation problem although the key feature of the selectivity is not only the lack of 
observations but also the fact that the observations included in the sample are potentially non-
random. The self-selection problem has been analysed in different context, after the seminal 
study of female earnings and labour supply (Heckman, 1974): some examples are union versus 
non-union employment, housing ownership versus renting, schooling decisions, training 
program participation, occupation choice or internal and international migration.  
These are all switching regression models, with endogenous switching: the central feature is 
the fact that individuals make alternative choices belonging to one group or another and in this 
way they self-select themselves. The observed realization of the decision is therefore truncated 
as the outcome is observed only for one part of the sample. For example, the product of the 
female labour supply, the earning, is observed only if women choose to be in the labour force 
and it is not observed otherwise. If standard econometric techniques, such as Ordinary Least 
Squares, are used to estimate female earnings, inconsistent estimates of the parameters may be 
generated, because of the failure to take into consideration the existence of a switching decision 
behind, which selects the sample observations. The observed wages of women, in fact, do not 
provide a reliable estimate of what non-participating women would have earned had they 
worked, as the earning functions of the selected sample may not represent the population wage 
functions.  
The study of Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) represents the first example of endogenous 
switching model applied to inter-state migration in United States. The problem of truncated 
sample arises because the authors model an individual migration decision as a function of wages 
differentials between home and destination: the information on earnings at origin however, is 
not observed for migrants, whereas the information at destination is not observed for non 
migrants. Therefore the authors predict the non-available information, through the estimation of 
wage equations for movers and for non-movers. However, given that individuals sort 
themselves into movers and stayers, the earning estimations need to control for the selectivity 
process. The application of the two-step procedure, developed by Heckman (1979) enables the 
estimation of consistent wage functions and moreover it allows to draw some conclusions upon Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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the existence of a sample selection generated by the migration process. Therefore, this is the 
prime attempt to estimate empirically and consistently the existence of a self-selection, using 
origin country specific data. 
The empirical equations of the model are: the selection rule, which is expressed in terms of 
the latent dependent variable 
*
i M and represent the migration function:  
i i
*
i u Z M + = γ       i = 1 … . , N     [ 1 0 ]  
where Z is a set of personal characteristics, influencing the decision to migrate. If  0
* > i M , the 
individual migrates.  
The earning if individual moves is: 
mi m mi mi X w ε β + =         [ 1 1 ]  
and the earning if individual stays is: 
si s si si X w ε β + =           [ 1 2 ]  
where X is a set of personal characteristics. For identification issues, the matrix Z should 
contain factors which influence the migration decision, but do not impact on earnings. 
According to the sample rule, the migration income  mi w  is observed only if 
*
i M <0; on the 
contrary if 
*
i M <0,  si w  realizes. The model assumes that the error terms in the earning and 
migration equations follow a normal bivariate distribution, with zero means and correlationρ . 
Therefore, the truncated conditional mean earning of migrants is: 
E ( mi mi w w is observed)= E ( 0 >
*
i mi M w )        [ 1 3 ]  
    =   E   ( ) Z u w i i mi γ − >        [ 1 4 ]  
    =   m i X β + E ( ) Z u i i mi γ ε − >       [ 1 5 ]  











and  ε ρσ δ =  
The authors estimate corrected earning functions for both migrants and non-migrants, which 
include the selectivity terms.  Provided that the selection rule for non-migrants implies that 
*
i M  
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and the conditional mean earning of non-migrants becomes: 
E ( si si w w is observed)=  si si i X ϕλ β +        [ 1 7 ]  
Given the form of the conditional mean, it follows that the marginal effect of the 
independent variables X on  i w  has two components: there is a direct effect of the variable X 
on i w , which is captured by β  and there is an additional effect, which exists because some of 
the Xs may influence the probability that  i M  is positive and therefore will enterλ  in [16]. The 
decision to migrate, in fact, depends on the net benefit of moving, which in turn depends on 
potential earnings at destination compared to origin. Therefore, individual characteristics that 
influence the migration choice do also affect the income received in either places. To correctly 
model a wage function within a context of migration, controlling for observable characteristics 
X is insufficient, as an additional feature is influencing the earnings, namely, the process 
governing whether an individual migrates. Therefore, the earning function needs to be adjusted 
for the selection term. Computationally speaking, the first stage of the double steps procedure 
estimates a probit migration function
9 and the fitted values are used to compute the selectivity 
term λ  in [16]. To generate support to the selectivity hypothesis, the selection correction terms 
have to enter the income equations significantly.  
The outcome of the analysis of Nakosteen and Zimmer is that the estimated coefficient of the 
selection is non-significant in the migrant earning function, whereas it is significant in the non-
migrant equation, providing support to the self-selection hypothesis at least with regards to the 
non-migrants. The authors interpret the result suggesting that “non-migrants in the population 
choose their status because they fail to perceive more favourable returns elsewhere” (Nakosteen 
and Zimmer, 1980; p. 847). 
Evidence of significant self-selection in the empirical literature, however, is quite mixed: 
Robinson and Tomes (1982), in the context of inter-provincial migration in Canada, find 
support to self-selection in both the movers and stayers groups, whereas Hunt and Kau (1985) 
find that the selectivity is not statistically significant in a model of inter country migration in 
United States. In more recent analysis, Lee and Roseman (1999) study a probit model for the 
probability of being employed for white and black males in United States, and report that the 
selection term for white man is not statistically significant, while the coefficient for black male 
is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that black migrants are positively selected. 
Agesa (2001) finds a positive selection term for migrants, moving from rural to urban areas in 
Kenya and a non-statistical term for non-migrants workers in rural areas. Brucker and 
Trubswetter (2004) analysing East-West migration in Germany, report significant and negative 
selection term for stayers and no robust result for movers. On the contrary, Axelsson and Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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Westerlund (1998) find insignificant coefficient for both stayers and movers in Sweden; 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) find that selectivity has no impact on earnings for Mexican 
resident and Mexican immigrants to United States; finally Adams (2005), find no sign of 
selectivity in a context of internal and international migration in Guatemala.      
The previous setup contains single choice selection criteria, implying that only two 
alternative options are offered to individuals. A generalization of this framework has been 
offered, allowing polychotomous choice models, where multiple options are presented to the 
individuals. For example many alternative locations can be offered to a worker, in place of a 
simple dichotomous choice between move and stay. The model of Falaris (1987) allows 17 
categories, which represent the individual choices of location in Venezuela and one potential 
outcome in each category: 
si s si si X w ε β + =          s=1…, D      i=1…., N      [18] 
where  si w  defines the earnings if destination s is chosen and X is a set of personal 
characteristics. The number of wage functions is equal to the number of possible destinations. 
Given the polychotomous latent index function Msi*: 
si si
*
si u Z M + = γ           [ 1 9 ]  
which depends on a set of personal characteristics (Z), Mi=s if the sth category is chosen:  
Mi=s  iff  
*
si M  > Max 
*
ji M   j=1…N, j≠s 
Defining  si ϑ = Max (
*
ji M )-  s u  
Mi =s  iff   si ϑ <  γ si Z  
Therefore, the probability that the destination s is chosen can be expressed as: 
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+ =         [ 2 1 ]  
where  ) ( ) (
1
si si J π π
− Φ = , denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution and φ  is 
the standard normal probability density function. According to the model of sample selection 
with polychotomous choices, the first step estimation consists in a conditional logit model, 
which allows the calculation of choice probabilities ( si π ). These probabilities form the sample 
selection correction term (the second term on the right hand side of equation [21]), which is 
added in the earning functions in the second step OLS estimation. Falaris (1987) finds Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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significant selectivity effects in six out of seventeen earning equations and the sign suggests that 
migrants are positively selected. 
A second type of generalization introduces multiple criteria for selectivity: the selectivity can 
derive from several sources and the switch follows from more than one decision function. 
Moreover, two cases can be distinguished: the joint decision model and the sequential decision 
model. The difference is that, given two selection equations for example, while in the joint 
decision model, the second selection function is defined over the full sample of observations, in 
the sequential decision model, the second selection function is defined only on a subset of 
observations, which depends on the outcome of the first selection. Tunali (1986) develops a 
double selection model, where the first selection rule allows the option to migrate or to stay, 




i u Z M + = γ 1           [ 2 2 ]  
which defines whether an individual migrate or not, and: 
i ,
*
i Z S υ ξ + = 1 2           [ 2 3 ]  
which determines whether an individual re-migrate or not. Z1 and Z2 are a set of individual 
characteristics. The earning equations are: 
i i i X w ε β + =           [ 2 4 ]  
 Given two dichotomous decision functions,  1 D = 0 or 1 and  2 D = 0 or 1, and given the 














where  s w  is the income if the “stay” option is chosen,  0 w is the “one-time move” income 
and  f w is the “frequent move” income. The earning functions for one time move and frequent 
move need to control for two selectivity terms and the parameters of these terms are obtained 
estimating a bivariate probit, which contains both the selection rules [22] and [23]. On the 
contrary, the wage function for stayers contains only one selection term, which follows from a 
univariate probit estimation. The outcome of the analysis of Tunali offers little support in favour 
of the selectivity hypothesis: in fact, estimating different specifications of the wage functions, 
the selectivity terms enter insignificantly in the many of the equations. 
  A similar methodology is followed in Barham and Boucher (1998), where the two 
sequential selection equations are a no-migration function and a labour participation function. 
If  1 D =0 
If  1 D =1 and  2 D =0 
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The authors estimate an earning function only for non-migrants, entering the labour force, 
because no observations are available if the individual chooses to migrate: the two selection 
coefficients, however, do not enter significantly. 
3.3.2 Semi-parametric and Non-parametric techniques  
The Heckman standard approach relies on strong parametric assumption of the error terms: 
in fact, it imposes the joint normality of the error term in the earning equation and in the 
selection equation. However, one potential limitation of this technique is its sensitivity to the 
violation of the assumed parametric distribution: if the normality assumption fails, the estimates 
turn inconsistent. The costs imposed by the parametric estimation, therefore placed some effort 
in relaxing these strong distributional assumptions: semi-parametric and non-parametric 
methods have been proposed. Non-parametric models require minimal assumption regarding the 
process generating the data, whereas semi-parametric models “combines a parametric form for 
some component of the data generating process (usually the behavioural relation between the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables) with weak non-parametric restrictions on the 
remainder of the model (usually the distribution of the unobservable errors)” (Powell, 1994, p. 
2444). 
In selection models, relaxing the joint normality assumption of the error terms in the wage 
and migration functions, the conditional mean earning for migrants in [13] becomes: 
E ( mi mi w w is observed)= m i X β + E ( ) Z u i i mi γ ε − >       [ 2 5 ]  
    = m i X β +  ) ( γ i Z g        [ 2 6 ]  
where g(.) is an unknown function, representing the correction function, which needs to be 
estimated semi-parametrically or non-parametrically. Moreover, the parametersγ , which enter 
the correction function are unknown and need to be estimated using a semi-parametric binary 
model.  
In the context of US inter-state migration, Dahl (2002) develops a semi-parametric selection 
model: in particular he estimates a polychotomous choice model to control for selectivity bias in 
individual earning equations. The author extends the Roy’s occupational choice model, allowing 
individuals to select the place to live and work among different states: the objective of the 
analysis is to test for selectivity bias in the returns to schooling and to compute unbiased returns.  
The sample selection correction in his framework takes the form of an unknown function of 
a small number of selection probabilities
10: the selection probabilities are estimated semi-
parametrically in the first step, and the correction functions are added in the second step 
estimation. The first result is that education increases the average migration probability: 
therefore, highly educated individuals are more mobile than lower educated workers. Secondly, Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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the returns to schooling in the corrected equation are almost uniformly lower than the returns in 
the uncorrected function: this suggests that the self-selection of high educated workers, who 
choose the destinations that offer a better match for their skills and talents, induces an upward 
bias in the education coefficients which are estimated with ordinary techniques. Third, the 
selection correction functions enter the earning equations significantly for almost all the states. 
The author concludes that “college migration choices might be more responsive to unobserved 
earnings because highly educated individuals are more likely to move for a fixed moving cost or 
because variation in the unobserved earnings across states is greater for individuals with a 
college degree” (Dahl, pp. 2400-04).  
Zaiceva (2005) applies the methodology in Newey and Vella (2003) to control for sample 
selectivity in East-West German migration: the approach consists in a non-parametric version of 
the usual sample selection model. The first step estimates non-parametrically the conditional 
probability of emigrating, while in the second step the correction function is approximated with 
polynomial series. The result suggests no support to self-selection among either the stayers or 
the movers. The author applies a similar methodology to analyse the effect of geographical 
mobility on the income of commuters, and differently, sign of self selection is found: in fact, 
commuters seem to be positively selected. Finally, the standard Heckman parametric model is 
used prior testing the respect of the normality assumption: the model provides quite similar 
results, corroborating the finding that movers are not self-selected. 
4. Conclusions 
The phenomenon of the brain drain has raised a series of concerns, as far as social and 
economic detrimental costs might become the major result of the process of international 
migration, from the view point of labour exporting countries. Nevertheless, despite the 
sensitivity of this topic, there is not a clear conclusion upon the existence of a process of 
selection among the migrants and in particular upon the direction of the selection. Is truly 
migration a selective process, inducing the brightest to move? The empirical investigation is 
hindered by a lack of comprehensive international data: in fact, not only the figures on 
international migration are limited, but also they do not offer detailed information on the 
observable characteristics of migrants. Moreover, the process of self-selection can occur along 
unobservable characteristics that, by their nature, cannot be captured.  Reviewing both the 
theoretical and the empirical studies, the objective of this paper is to draw some light upon the 
factors which are likely to induce a skilled rather than an un-skilled migration as well as upon Cristina Cattaneo, The Self-Selection in the Migration Process: What Can We Learn? 
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the existence of a process of self-selection in migration and its direction, both in terms of 
observable and un-observable characteristics. 
The contribution of the theoretical literature is the finding that sending country 
characteristics  vis-à-vis host country conditions –earning gaps, different level of inequality, 
asymmetric information- create uneven incentives for different levels of abilities or education, 
and therefore create the ground for a selectivity process. Second, migration costs do play a 
major role in determining the direction of the selectivity: in fact, it has been found that the 
direction of the selection crucially depends on the size of the fixed migration costs, and it is also 
influenced by the possibility that ability dampens part of this expenditure. To summarize, 
negative selectivity likely arises on the one hand if destination countries face imperfect 
information in the process of screening the foreign labour force and on the other hand if the 
investment in migration does not imply high fixed costs, provided that the origin country has 
higher inequality than destination. On the contrary, if the information asymmetry is placed in 
the origin country, or if the fixed costs of migration are sizeable or if ability and schooling 
contribute to either dampen the costs or to increase earnings, then positive selection likely 
occurs. Finally it should be noted that host country migration policies as well as demand side 
considerations, such as the type of migrants’ skill requested in the foreign labour market, 
influence the direction of the selection.  
The empirical evidence corroborates the importance of costs as determinants of the 
selectivity, to the extent that the brain drain is found to have a geographical connotation. In fact, 
the educational gap between migrants and non-migrants proved to vary significantly across 
countries with different proximity with the destination nation: the lower the distance, which 
implies smaller fixed costs, the lower the degree of positive selection.  
The assessment of the educational endowment of the existing stock of migrants suggests that 
the direction of the selectivity does vary considerably across countries: in fact, while for some 
labour exporting nations the emigrant flow is mainly characterized by highly educated 
individuals, it also true that for another big set of countries, the emigration flow is 
predominantly made by low skilled individuals: not only migrate the brightest and most 
educated, but also people with primary education or less. However, for some countries the loss 
of tertiary educated individuals can be quite considerably, if compared with the total number of 
remaining residents for the same educational group. 
The final consideration analyses the direction of the selectivity in terms of unobservable 
characteristics, such as motivation, ability or ambition: the empirical finding is again quite 
mixed, in the sense that the results seem to vary from country to country. However, the overall 
outcome is that movers are either positively selected or not selected at all: in fact, there are not Liuc Papers n. 199, febbraio 2007 
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cases of negative selectivity in terms of unobservable features. It should be noted, however, that 
some of the empirical studies reviewed might be subject to inconsistency problems, because of 
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1 The authors do not try to analyse the first emigration choice, which is occurring when individuals leave 
their countries for advanced studies, but they analyse only the second one, when individuals decide 
the place to work, whether home or abroad. 
2 The scenario analysed by Kwok and Leland, which gives rise to a positive selection, is characterised by 
asymmetric information in the emigrants’ home country and by a small wage differential between 
home and destination markets. 
3 Dahl (2002) presents a list of authors who develop the Roy model of self selection applied to alternative 
settings: for example in female labour force participation; union versus non union employment 
decision; college attendance decision; occupation or industry choices; training program participation 
and internal migration. 





ρ =  is positive and 
sufficiently large. This condition requires that the employers in different countries value the same 
individual attributes in a consistent way. 
5 Borjas, however, clarifies that in the original Roy model the type of dispersion which determines the 
outcome refers to opportunities dispersion, given socioeconomic characteristics, rather than income 
dispersion. In fact, the analytical condition that determines the direction of the selectivity depends, as 
stated, on  H F / σ σ . 
























7 Provided high and positive correlation between income and level of education, migrants with low level 
of schooling are likely to face higher borrowing costs, because of higher expected probability of 
default. 
8 According to the function specified by Chiswick the assimilation process is captured by the variable 
years since migration. 
9Given the latent Index function:  i i
*
i u Z M + = γ , if  0 >
*
i M ,  i M =1, and if  0 <
*
i M ,  i M=0.  The 
estimated probit function is: Prob( i M =1)=  γ i Z ( Φ ). 
10 The author extends the framework developed in Ahn and Powell (1993) to allow for multiple-index 
model, in place of a single index-model.  